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THE ANALYSIS IS SIMPLE: A CHILD’S RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN DEPENDENCY AND NEGLECT
PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Jennifer Shannon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana’s Constitution provides minors the same protections as
adults: “The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include, but not be
limited to, all the fundamental rights of [Article II] unless specifically pre-
cluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons.”1 Likewise,
the Montana Supreme Court has held that under this constitutional provi-
sion, “youths are entitled to the same or greater due process rights as
adults.”2 Parents in dependency proceedings have a due process right under
the Montana Constitution to court-appointed council, because of the sub-
stantial threat of unfair procedure in determining the termination of their
parental rights.3 Thus, under Article II, Section 15 of the Montana Constitu-
tion, the child should be provided the same protections as adults in depen-
dent-neglect proceedings—including the right to court-appointed counsel.
This comment argues that given Article II, Section 15’s text, intent,
and development in the courts, children must be appointed attorneys in de-
pendency proceedings. Part II briefly explains the process of dependency
proceedings, and the federal and state statutory framework that guides
them. Part III first explains the rights implicated in dependency proceed-
ings, which have been complicated by the courts. It then explains the ori-
gins of procedural due process in the federal system. Lastly, it discusses
Montana’s extension of procedural due process to parents in dependency
proceedings, giving parents the right to counsel. Part IV discusses four
Montana Supreme Court cases regarding a child’s right to counsel in depen-
dency proceedings. Part V describes how Article II, Section 15 entitles chil-
dren to appointed counsel in dependency proceedings, both in its plain text
and the Montana Constitutional Framer’s intent. Part VI continues the anal-
ysis by examining the implications of declaring a child’s right to an attor-
* Jennifer Pepprock Shannon, Candidate for J.D. 2019, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at
the University of Montana. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Montana Law Review, as
well as Professor Anthony Johnstone, for their enormous help and guidance on this project. I also wish
to thank my husband and parents for supporting and encouraging me throughout this project and the
entirety of my education.
1. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
2. In re G.T.M., 222 P.3d 626, 630 (Mont. 2009) (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15; In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 13, 27–28 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
3. In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129–30 (Mont. 1993).
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ney under Article II, Section 15, and Part VII concludes that the Court must
find Montana’s current dependency statutory framework unconstitutional.
II. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
A dependency proceeding is unique; “[i]t is civil in nature, although it
contains similarities to criminal proceedings.”4 Before a dependency pro-
ceeding formally begins, a state child welfare agency receives information
about possible abuse or neglect of a child.5 From there, the agency investi-
gates and determines whether or not the child needs to be removed from the
home.6 Within 20 days of the child being removed from the home, the State
must proceed to prove at a show cause hearing that the child should con-
tinue to be in the State’s protective custody.7
Every dependency case is different.8 Generally, after the court has de-
termined the child should be held in the State’s custody, the parties move
forward with the ultimate goal of preserving the biological family unit
whenever possible.9 During this stage, parents must complete their treat-
ment plan, which is an agreement between the parent and the agency outlin-
ing the actions the parent must take to have their child returned.10 A pro-
ceeding ends when the parent completes their treatment plan and the State
determines the child may return home, or when the State moves to termi-
nate parental rights.11 Under Montana statute, if a child has been out of the
home for 15 of the last 22 months, the law presumes termination is in the
best interests of the child.12
In a termination proceeding, the State must prove termination is appro-
priate by clear and convincing evidence.13 Ultimately, a court may termi-
nate parental rights if: “(1) the court has adjudicated the child a youth in
need of care, (2) the parent has failed to comply with a court ordered treat-
4. Suparna Malempati, The Illusion of Due Process for Children in Dependency Proceedings, 44
CUMB. L. REV. 181, 187 (2014).
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–101(2) (2017).
6. MONTANA CFS POLICY MANUAL: INVESTIGATION/ASSESSMENT OF REPORT, § 202-3, p. 1–3
(2015), https://perma.cc/783Z-CHES (https://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/cfsd/documents/cfsdmanual/202-
3.pdf) (last visited on August 6, 2018).
7. MONTANA CFS POLICY MANUAL: LEGAL PROCEDURE REQUIRED JUDICIAL HEARINGS, § 301–2,
p. 1–2 (2011), https://perma.cc/M6UN-LFLS (https://dphhs.mt.gov/Portals/85/cfsd/documents/cfsd
manual/301-2.pdf) (last visited on August 6, 2018).
8. Malempati, supra note 4, at 189.
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–101(b) (2017).
10. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–102(30) (2017); MONTANA CFS POLICY MANUAL: LEGAL PROCE-
DURE COURT-ORDERED TREATMENT PLAN/STIPULATION, § 303–1, p. 1 (2009), https://dphhs.mt.gov/Por-
tals/85/cfsd/ documents/cfsdmanual/301-2.pdf.
11. Malempati, supra note 4, at 189.
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–422(14)(b) (2017).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–422(5)(b)(iv).
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ment plan, and (3) the conduct or condition of the parent rendering the
parent unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.”14
A. Federal Statutory Framework
To receive federal funding for child abuse or neglect treatment and
prevention programs, states are required by the Federal Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) to provide each child either a Guard-
ian ad Litem (GAL) or a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA).15
States are not required under CAPTA to provide children with attorneys.16
The required GAL is obligated to make recommendations regarding the
child’s best interests to the court.17
CAPTA arose after the United State Supreme Court’s decision in In re
Gault,18 which effectively split the juvenile justice system into two separate
systems.19 In one, children engaged in delinquent activities were appointed
attorneys to represent them before the court.20 In the other, children who
were involved in dependency proceedings were not entitled to appointed
legal counsel.21
To comply with CAPTA, state legislators have developed laws to pro-
vide GALs and CASAs for children.22 They are inconsistent, however, in
providing every child an attorney to represent their wishes in court.23
B. Montana’s Statutory Framework
Prior to 2011, a Montana statute required that all children in dependent
neglect proceedings be appointed an attorney and a GAL.24 In 2011 that law
changed, and it now provides an exception to providing children attorneys
where the court appoints a GAL or CASA for the child. Montana Code
Annotated Section 41–3–425 now provides:
(2) [T]he court shall immediately appoint the office of state public defender
to assign counsel for: (a) any indigent parent, guardian, or other person hav-
14. In re R.M.T., 256 P.3d 935, 939 (Mont. 2011) (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 41–3–609(1)(f)
(2011); In re I.B., 255 P.3d 56, 61 (Mont. 2011)).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2012).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2012).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii)(II) (2012).
18. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. Malempati, supra note 4, at 185.
20. Id.; see also Rebecca Stursberg, Still in Flux: Reinterpreting Montana’s Rights-of-Minors Pro-
vision, 79 MONT. L. REV. 515–21 (2018).
21. Malempati, supra note 4, at 185–86.
22. Id. at 186.
23. Id.
24. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–425(2)(b) (2009).
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ing legal custody of a child . . . (b) any child or youth involved in a proceed-
ing . . . when a guardian ad litem is not appointed for the child . . .
This part of the statute is known as the “GAL exception.”25
The framework, however, does not merely favor the appointment of
GAL over an attorney. Montana Code Annotated Section 41–3–112 states:
“In every judicial proceeding the court shall appoint a court-appointed spe-
cial advocate as the guardian ad litem for any child alleged to be abused or
neglected.”26 This bill, enacted in 2017, prioritizes that a CASA be ap-
pointed over a GAL or an attorney.27 Importantly, though, there exists a
major difference between CASAs and GALs.28 CASAs are unpaid volun-
teers, whereas GALs are paid professionals, usually attorneys.29 Although
the statute requires that the GAL or CASA both receive “appropriate” train-
ing and, under the statute, both GALs and CASAs have the same duties to
investigate, report, and advocate for the child’s best interests, neither are an
attorney for the child and therefore neither operate under the lawyer’s rules
of professional conduct.30
While federal law requires states to provide each child a GAL or
CASA, that was not the reason Montana’s legislature proposed the revision
to Montana Code Annotated Sections 41–3–425 or 43–1–112. The amend-
ment to Section 41–3–425 was introduced by Montana State Senator Larry
Jent who argued that the purpose of the Bill was to provide judges with
discretion regarding the appointment of children’s attorneys in dependency
proceedings, particularly where “no need for individual representation” ex-
isted because the child was so young that they could not express their
wishes to an attorney.31 The Bill’s proponents argued that the GALs already
informed the court of the child’s wishes and thus an advocate attorney for a
child’s wishes was unnecessary.32 Ultimately, the Bill was added as a cost-
saving measure for the Office of the State Public Defender, which would no
longer have to pay for a child’s attorney unless a court affirmatively
deemed it necessary.33 Likewise, Section 41–3–112’s sponsor, Representa-
25. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457, 472 (Mont. 2015) (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–112(1) (2017).
27. Audio Hearing on Mont. H.B. 201, 65th Leg. Before H. Human Services Comm. (January 16,
2017). https://perma.cc/MN4P-F98C (http://montanalegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=
20663&meta_id=169457) (last visited August 6, 2018).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–112 (2017); Audio Hearing on Mont. H.B. 201, 65th Leg. Before H.
Human Services Comm. (January 16, 2017).
31. Larry Jent, Revise Guardian ad Litem Laws to Allow Judges’ [sic] Discretion in Appointed
Counsel: Hearing on Mont. S.B. 153 62d Leg. Before the S. Judiciary Comm. 1:53 (Mont. 2011) (audio
available at https://perma.cc/PSQ3-7GRD).
32. Id. at 4:03.
33. Id. at 4:35.
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tive Rob Cook, stated in his closing remarks that CASAs, unlike GALs or
Attorneys, were free—and therefore the Bill would minimize the enormous
costs that dependency proceedings already create for the State.34
Thus, under Montana’s current statutory scheme, no framework exists
requiring courts to appoint an attorney to children in a dependency proceed-
ing. That does not mean, however, that no important rights are implicated
for children in dependency proceedings.
III. THE RIGHTS ISSUE IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Dependency proceedings can sever the biological family relationship
and thus may potentially implicate the rights of individuals. As children are
the focus of dependency proceedings,35 this section will first look to the
rights of minors contained in Montana’s Constitution, Article II, Section 15,
and Montana’s right to equal protection36 which Montana’s courts have
held must be read alongside Article II, Section 15.37 Children, however, are
not the only ones who stand to lose something in dependency proceedings,
and therefore this section will also examine the right to due process and
specifically, counsel, for parents in dependency proceedings in federal and
Montana courts.
A. The Rights of Children in Montana under Article II, Section 15
1. The Provision and its History
Montana’s Constitution provides that children are equal to adults, with
all of the same fundamental rights. Article II, Section 15 states:
Rights of persons not adults. The rights of persons under 18 years of age
shall include, but not be limited to, all the fundamental rights of this Article
unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protections of such
persons.
Section 15 was created to remedy the lack of rights given to children
under equal protection. Delegate Monroe, who proposed Section 15, stated
that he proposed the Section because “The Supreme Court has not ruled in
[children’s] favor under the equal protection clause.”38 Delegate Monroe
added that the Section sought to ensure “that persons under the age of ma-
34. Audio Hearing on Mont. H.B. 201, 65th Leg. Before H. Human Services Comm. (January 16,
2017).
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–101(1)(a) (2017).
36. See Stursberg, supra note 20, at 515–21 (explaining how the rights-of-minors provision is read
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Montana Constitution).
37. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457, 472 (Mont. 2015) (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing
In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Mont. 1997)).
38. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1750 (1981) [hereinafter 5
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT].
5
Shannon: The Analysis is Simple
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2018
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-2\MON204.txt unknown Seq: 6 16-OCT-18 10:42
236 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 79
jority have been accorded certain specific rights which are felt to be part of
due process,”39 with the “crux” of the Section being a proposal “that per-
sons under the age of majority have the same protections from governmen-
tal and majoritarian abuses as do adults.”40 Finally, Delegate Dahood stated
“what we are doing by this article is focusing on the basic guarantees that
citizens have with respect to their person, their property, and their lib-
erty.”41
Debate surrounding the Section focused on whether it was necessary
given that children were “people” already protected by Article II.42 Dele-
gates Dahood and Monroe specified that Section 15 was necessary because
young men and women were not provided due process particularly when
being prosecuted for minor crimes.43 Delegate Monroe recalled a situation
he faced as a child where he was thrown in jail without being told any
reason. Being incarcerated, he never got to attend his first and only basket-
ball tournament.44 Despite concern that Section 15 was unnecessary, it
passed with 76 delegates voting aye and 11 voting no.45 It was then incor-
porated into the Montana Constitution as a “new provision giving children
all the rights that adults have unless a law meant to protect children prohib-
its their enjoyment of that right.”46
Section 15 of the Montana Constitution is unique. Delegate Monroe
hoped that Montana “[could] be the leader among all the states in recogniz-
ing the rights of people under the age of majority.”47 Indeed, the provision
itself is unique in the United States because it provides outright that chil-
dren should be treated equally. The development of this provision in the
courts, however, has been minute and often contrary to the intent of the
framers, ultimately causing more confusion than necessary.
2. The Court’s Interpretation of the Provision
a. Handling Violations of Article II, Section 15
In order for a violation of Article II, Section 15 to be constitutional, the
Court requires that the law serves a compelling state interest under strict
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1751.
42. Id. at 1751–52.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1751.
45. Id.
46. Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana, Official Text with Explanation, March
22, 1972, p. 6.
47. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 38 at 1750.
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scrutiny and also that the law enhances the rights of minors.48 While strict
scrutiny is the appropriate test for a violation of Article II, Section 15 as a
fundamental right in Montana’s constitution, the second part of this test is
an incorrect interpretation of Article II, Section 15 that serves only to com-
plicate the Section 15 analysis.
Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for analyzing violations of
Article II, Section 15. The use of strict scrutiny for a Section 15 violation
traces back to In re S.L.M.,49 in which the Court held that if the legislature
seeks to carve out an exception for treating children different than adults it
“must . . . show a compelling state interest.”50 However, S.L.M. does not
plainly provide that all violations of Section 15 require strict scrutiny; just
before the Court’s statement of the Section 15 test, it determined that a
compelling state interest was required in S.L.M.’s case because applying an
adult sentence to a child implicated the child’s physical liberty, which is a
fundamental right requiring a compelling state interest under strict scru-
tiny.51 The Court then stated, “[W]e must therefore apply a strict scrutiny
analysis and determine whether there is a compelling state interest suffi-
cient to justify such an infringement and whether such an infringement is
consistent with the mandates of Article II, Section 15 of the Montana Con-
stitution.”52 The separation here of a compelling state interest from the Sec-
tion 15 analysis, therefore, suggests that the compelling state interest re-
quirement only applies in cases where a fundamental right that requires
strict scrutiny, such as physical liberty, is implicated. Although the test pro-
vided in S.L.M. is unclear, strict scrutiny should always apply to a Section
15 challenge.
Strict scrutiny must be required to overcome a Section 15 challenge. In
Montana, the default scrutiny for fundamental rights is strict scrutiny,
which means that strict scrutiny applies to the fundamental rights found
within Article II.53 Section 15 is contained in Article II.54 And further, look-
ing at the provision, Section 15 grants children “all the fundamental rights
of [Article II] . . . .”55 Therefore, Section 15 requires a strict scrutiny analy-
sis as it applies solely to fundamental rights, which under Montana law
deserve strict scrutiny.
48. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457, 472 (Mont. 2015) (McKinnon, J., dissenting) (citing In re S.L.M.,
951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Mont. 1997)).
49. In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365.
50. Id. at 1373.
51. Id. at 1372.
52. Id.
53. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 122 (Mont. 1997).
54. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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The second part of the Court’s current test for analyzing a violation of
Section 15, however, is inconsistent with the text of the Section. Again in
S.L.M., the Court held that a violation of Section 15 could only be cured if
the legislature showed that the statute was “designed to enhance the rights
of minors.”56 Looking at the Provision, however, it requires that any excep-
tion to Section 15 enhances “the protections” of children.57 While it is un-
clear where this word-swap came from, the Court in S.L.M. announced this
test immediately following the Bill of Right’s Committee’s comments that
follow Section 15.58 Nowhere in those comments did the Committee switch
the words “rights” and “protections.”59 As the words “protection” and
“rights” implicate two different meanings, this misinterpretation of the Sec-
tion complicates the analysis of violations of Section 15 by adding a part to
the analysis that is unfounded in the Section’s text. This, however, is not the
only way in which the Court has complicated the Section 15 analysis.
b. Alongside Equal Protection
The Montana Supreme Court has held that Section 15 “must be read in
conjunction with the guarantee of equal protection found in Article II, Sec-
tion 4.”60 This, the Court explains, is because the Bill of Rights Committee
indicated that equal protection was a primary purpose of Section 15.61 The
Bill of Rights Committee did, in fact, indicate that part of the reason for
Section 15 was because “the Supreme Court has not ruled in [minors’]
favor under the equal protection clause.”62 However, there are several is-
sues with the Court’s conclusion that Section 15 must be read alongside
Montana’s equal protection provision.
First, equal protection is not the only right the Bill of Rights Commit-
tee noted was a purpose for Section 15. The Committee also specifically
indicated that children should be accorded these rights as “a part of due
process.”63 Under the Court’s reasoning, therefore, Montana’s due process
provision, Article II, Section 17, should always be read alongside Section
15 as well.
Second, the statement of the Committee relied on by the Court notes a
marked departure from equal protection in Section 15. The Committee
56. In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1373 (emphasis added).
57. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15 (emphasis added).
58. In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1373.
59. Id. (quoting 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 635–36 (1971)
[hereinafter 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT]).
60. Id. at 1374.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT at 635–36).
63. Id. (quoting 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT at 635–36).
8
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stated that Section 15 was needed because, under the Equal Protection
Clause, courts had not ruled in favor of minors.64 Rather than making Sec-
tion 15 an extension of equal protection, this statement exemplified the
framer’s intent to create Section 15 as a right separate from equal protection
which had failed to adequately protect minors in the courts.
Finally, the transcripts from the Constitutional Convention also
demonstrate the framer’s intent to create Section 15 as a stand-alone protec-
tion for minors, separate from equal protection or any other amendment. In
the floor debate, Delegate Brown argued that the provision was unnecessary
as the Bill of Rights already applied to children, stating “I don’t see, really,
the purpose of this article . . . . This Bill of Rights covers all people, and it
doesn’t say only those over the age of majority.”65 Delegate Dahood re-
sponded that the provision served a definite purpose: “It merely makes sure
that [children] have the basic rights that many of us assume that they do . . .
and this will make sure that this Constitution and Bill of Rights does apply
to all citizens regardless of age.”66 Delegate Dahood’s answer provides that
Section 15 serves its own independent purpose, and therefore should be
read apart from other rights in Montana’s Bill of Rights that presumably
may apply to children, including equal protection.
For these reasons, Article II, Section 15 must not be mandatorily read
alongside equal protection. Although it seems that Article II, Section 15 is
an extension of equal protection, based on the text of the Bill of Rights
Committee and the Constitutional Convention Transcripts, it was not the
intent of the framers for Article II, Section 15 to be read along with equal
protection. Article II, Section 15 provides its own, strong, independent pro-
tections specifically for minors. Indeed, reading Section 15 alongside equal
protection only serves to create more confusion.
Equal protection only muddles the analysis of Section 15 because
Montana’s equal protection doctrine is unclear. Montana’s equal protection
provision, found in Article II, Section 4, reads:
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of
his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.
On its face, Montana’s equal protection provision provides a wide ar-
ray of terms and phrases to unpack. Section 4 acknowledges that private
individuals, not only the State, can violate an individual’s equal protection
64. Id. (quoting 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT at 635–36).
65. 5 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 38 at 1750.
66. Id. at 1752.
9
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right67 and also provides protection based on numerous individual qualities
including political ideas and social origin.68 Finally, Section 4 includes in-
dividual dignity as part of equal protection.69 Thus, Montana’s provision is
already complicated in its text by covering many different classifications of
individuals without definition.
On its face, the Court’s test for determining whether there has been a
violation of equal protection in Montana seems simple. Montana Courts
“first identify the classes involved and determine whether they are similarly
situated.”70 After determining whether the classes are similarly situated, the
Court decide what the appropriate level of scrutiny is.71 If the violation
implicates a fundamental right present in Article II, then the court applies
strict scrutiny.72 If not, the Court applies either intermediate scrutiny or
rational basis depending on the right and the facts of the case.73
While this analysis seems straightforward, it often is complicated by
the fact that the Court has not settled on a definition of “similarly situated.”
Donaldson v. State74 proved just how much confusion surrounds the phrase
“similarly situated.” In Justice Nelson’s Donaldson dissent, he pointed out
that Montana’s courts had failed to flesh out the exact meaning of “simi-
larly situated.”75 Thus, Justice Nelson suggested that the Montana Courts
look to federal precedent.76 Examining this federal precedent, Justice Nel-
son contended that being similarly situated “is not always susceptible to
precise demarcation,” but asked “whether the plaintiff’s group is ‘roughly
equivalent’ to the control group in ‘all relevant respects’ other than the fac-
tor constituting the alleged discrimination.”77 Further, Justice Nelson added,
“exact correlation is neither likely or necessary, but the cases must be fair
congeners.”78 Justice Nelson exposed the Court’s inability to determine
what similarly situated means while at the same time noting that similarly
situated is nearly impossible to precisely define. This displays the confusion
which flows from Montana’s equal protection provision and provides the
final reason why equal protection must not be read concurrently with Sec-
67. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys. 104 P.3d 445, 449 (Mont. 2004) (citing Henry v. State Compen-
sation Ins. Fund, 982 P.2d 456, 461 (Mont. 1999)).
71. Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 449–50 (citing Henry, 982 P.2d at 461).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364 (2012).
75. Id. at 395 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2004); Tapiaian v. Tusino, 377
F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 705 (9th Cir. 1989)).
78. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting Tapalian, 377 F.3d at 6).
10
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tion 15 if the courts wish to have any clarity in providing for the rights of
minors.
B. Due Process
1. Due Process Generally
Whether an individual is entitled to counsel in a civil proceeding is
analyzed under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.79 These amend-
ments, which apply to federal and state actors respectively, provide that no
person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”80 The Court has recognized that this due process “‘is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circum-
stances,’” and thus the phrase due process expresses only a “fundamental
fairness, a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance
is lofty.”81
Though procedural due process is “lofty,” the United States Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge82 created a three-part test for determining
whether due process has been carried out under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. First, a court analyzes the private interests at stake; second, it
analyzes the government’s interest at stake; and third, it analyzes the risk
that the procedure will result in erroneous decision.83 Under this test, a
court “must balance these elements against each other, and then set their net
weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to ap-
pointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his
personal freedom.”84
2. Federal Due Process and the Parental Right to Counsel in
Dependency Proceedings
The U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized an express right to coun-
sel for parents in dependency proceedings.85 In Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services, Lassiter’s son, William, was removed from her care by the
Durham County Department of Social Services after she allegedly failed to
79. See Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (while
Lassiter only lists the Fourteenth Amendment as a source for due process rights to counsel in civil
proceedings, the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States; the Fifth amendment provides due
process protections from state actors).
80. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
81. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24 (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
83. Id. at 335.
84. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
85. Id. at 31–32.
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provide William with adequate medical care.86 Three years later the Depart-
ment petitioned for termination of Lassiter’s parental rights.87 In that termi-
nation proceeding, Lassiter was not appointed an attorney.88 Despite
Lassiter’s best efforts to represent herself, the trial court held that Lassiter
had “willfully failed to maintain concern or responsibility for the welfare of
a minor,” and it was in the child’s best interests to terminate Lassiter’s
parental rights.89 Lassiter appealed, arguing that because she was an indi-
gent, she was entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to assistance of
counsel.90
The Supreme Court balanced the Mathews factors against the pre-
sumption that court-appointed counsel is not generally required unless there
is a potential deprivation of physical liberty, and it concluded that although
the Mathews factors weighed heavily in favor of Lassiter, the Mathews
analysis did not ultimately show that Lassiter deserved due process in the
form of appointed counsel.91 Instead, the Court held, whether a parent is
entitled to counsel in dependency proceedings depends on the unique facts
of the case.92 And, in looking at the unique facts of Lassiter’s case, the
Court ultimately affirmed the termination of her parental rights.93
While the U.S. Supreme Court held parents generally are not entitled
to counsel in dependency proceedings, it also acknowledged that “[a] wise
public policy, however, may require that higher standards be adopted than
those minimally tolerable under the [federal] Constitution,” and that
“[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is enti-
tled to assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination pro-
ceedings, but in dependency neglect proceedings as well.”94 The Court,
therefore, left the floor open for the states to provide more due process
rights to parents in dependency proceedings.
3. Montana Due Process and the Parental Right to Counsel in
Dependency Proceedings
Indeed, Montana did rise above the federal floor to provide the right to
counsel for parents in dependency proceedings under Montana’s due pro-
cess provision.95 That provision reads “[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
86. Id. at 20.
87. Id. at 20–21.
88. Id. at 21.
89. Id. at 23–24 (quotations omitted).
90. Id. at 24.
91. Id. at 31.
92. Id. at 32 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
93. Id. at 34.
94. Id. at 33–34 (citations omitted).
95. In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129–30 (Mont. 1993).
12
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liberty, or property without due process of law.”96 In In Re A.S.A.97 a
mother appealed after her parental rights were terminated by the district
court. She argued that because she had not been appointed counsel, termi-
nating her parental rights violated the Montana Constitution’s due process
provision.98 The Montana Supreme Court agreed.99
The Court held that under Montana’s Constitution, a natural parent has
the right and fundamental liberty interest in the “care and custody of his or
her child,” which must be protected in judicial proceedings.100 The Court
explained:
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital in-
terest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If any-
thing, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a
more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state
intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State moves to destroy
weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally
fair procedures.101
Without conducting the Mathews test, the Court held in A.S.A. that
providing parents with court-appointed counsel was important to maintain-
ing the fundamental fairness of the judicial system because “[w]ithout rep-
resentation, a parent would not have an equal opportunity to present evi-
dence and scrutinize the State’s evidence.”102 Relying on this fundamental
fairness derived from Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution, the
Court held “that the due process clause in our State Constitution guarantees
an indigent parent the right to court-appointed counsel in proceedings
brought to terminate parental rights.”103 Thus, Montana expanded the pro-
tections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti-
tution by providing court-appointed counsel to parents in dependency pro-
ceedings under the Montana Constitution.
96. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17.
97. In re A.S.A. 852 P.2d at 129–30.
98. Id. at 128.
99. Id. at 129.
100. Id. (citing In re R.B., 703 P.2d 846, 848 (Mont. 1985)).
101. Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 130.
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IV. MONTANA’S INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN
DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 15
Four recent cases before the Montana Supreme Court have spoken
about the rights of children to an attorney in dependency proceedings: In re
A.D.B.,104 In re R.M.T.,105 In re J.W.C.,106 and In re T.D.H.107 In two of
these cases, the Court was asked specifically to decide whether children
must be appointed an attorney in dependency proceedings under Article II,
Section 15.108 Although none of these decisions have held that children
have a right to an attorney, each opinion displays the Court’s variety of
strong opinions on the rights of minors in dependency proceedings.
A. In re A.D.B.
At the age of three, A.D.B. was removed from her parents’ home after
her mother was arrested for driving under the influence and her father was
charged with deliberate homicide.109 At the start of the proceedings, the
district court appointed A.D.B. a GAL and an attorney.110 The district court
also appointed A.D.B.’s parents their own respective attorneys.111
Based on the mother’s several relapses, and the father’s inability to be
released from prison, the State moved for the termination of A.D.B.’s
mother’s and father’s parental rights.112 Both parents and A.D.B. appealed
the district court’s termination order.113
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the termination of A.D.B.’s par-
ents’ rights, citing the overwhelming facts indicating termination was in
A.D.B.’s best interests.114 The Court concluded, “[c]hildren need not be left
to ‘twist in the wind’ before neglect may be found chronic and severe.”115
While the majority addressed A.D.B.’s appeal of the termination, it did not
address whether the Court had erred in appointing A.D.B. an attorney.116
This question was not before the Court.117
104. 305 P.3d 739 (Mont. 2013).
105. 256 P.3d 935 (Mont. 2011).
106. Id.
107. 356 P.3d 457 (Mont. 2015).
108. Id. at 463; J.W.C., 265 P.3d at 1272.
109. In re A.D.B., 305 P.3d at 741, 752 (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 743.
113. Id. at 744.
114. Id. at 751.
115. Id. at 743 (quoting In re M.N., 261 P.3d 1047, 1053 (Mont. 2011)).
116. Id. at 741–51.
117. Id. at 741.
14
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Despite that, Chief Justice McGrath argued in his concurrence that the
district court had erred in appointing A.D.B. an attorney.118 He noted that
although the district court had ample evidence to prove termination was in
A.D.B.’s best interest, A.D.B.’s attorney had argued against termination on
appeal.119 The Chief Justice found this argument particularly troubling be-
cause A.D.B. was only three years old.120 He asked, “How did an attorney
representing a three-year old child reach this conclusion?”121
In analyzing the GAL exception in Montana Code Annotated Section
41–3–425 Chief Justice McGrath found that “as a general rule, appointment
of an attorney for a child is not required unless a G.A.L. is not ap-
pointed.”122 His concurrence then argued in favor of the discretion allowed
by this statute, opining that  discretion is logical when children under the
age of reason are the subject of dependency proceedings.123 Plainly, he ar-
gued that a child who is under the age of reason, or unable to adequately
convey his or her wishes, should not be appointed an attorney to represent
those wishes.124
According to Chief Justice McGrath, “Nothing in the Montana Consti-
tution, statutes, or case law provides a right to counsel for the child.”125
And, to prove that children do not have a right to an attorney, he turned to
the rules of ethics governing lawyers, arguing:
The child is the subject of [dependency proceedings] but does not have the
ability to provide direction for the attorney as to how to proceed. How does
the attorney determine her client’s legal position? Should it be based on the
personal view of the lawyer? That is not our proper role as attorneys.126
Explaining this argument, the Chief Justice found that a lawyer’s duties
under the Montana Rules of Professional Conduct regarding scope of repre-
sentation, allocation of authority, and attorney-client communication are not
possible when the client is “an infant or below the age of reason.”127 Ulti-
mately, Chief Justice McGrath concluded, “[t]here are situations where an
attorney’s presence is not helpful or appropriate and merely serves to un-
necessarily complicate or delay proceedings. This is one of those situa-
tions.”128
118. Id. at 751 (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
119. Id. at 752.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 751 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–425 (2011)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 752.
128. Id. at 753.
15
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B. In re R.M.T.
R.M.T. was placed in foster care after his mother was incarcerated for
partner or family member assault.129 Shortly after being returned to his
mother’s home in 2008, R.M.T. visited the Yellowstone County Attorney’s
Office on his own accord and told them he feared his mother’s abuse would
continue, that his mother would often return home drunk, and that she had
hit him in the past.130 After confirming R.M.T.’s allegations, the State filed
for emergency protective services.131 R.M.T.’s father had been absent for
most of R.M.T.’s life.132
The district court appointed a GAL, who also served as R.M.T.’s attor-
ney.133 The district court also assigned counsel to R.M.T.’s mother and fa-
ther.134 After two years, the State petitioned for termination of the mother
and father’s parental rights as both parents had failed to comply with their
treatment plans.135 Because R.M.T.’s father failed to complete his treatment
plan, and termination was in the best interests of R.M.T., the district court
terminated R.M.T.’s mother’s and father’s parental rights.136 R.M.T.’s fa-
ther appealed, arguing that the district court violated his due process rights
when it declined his request to cross-examine R.M.T.’s GAL at the termina-
tion hearing.137
The majority held that even when the child has a GAL who is also
their attorney, due process requires that parents be able to cross-examine
GALs who submit factual reports to the court.138 Thus, the district court had
erred.139 The majority held, however, that the error was harmless and there-
fore confirmed the validity of the termination of R.M.T.’s parent’s rights.140
In his concurrence, Justice Nelson took the majority’s analysis one
step further, arguing that a GAL may not function as both a GAL and the
child’s attorney.141 Although Justice Nelson based his analysis on the pre-
GAL-exception Montana Statute which required children be appointed at-
129. In re R.M.T., 256 P.3d 935, 937 (Mont. 2011).
130. Id. at 937.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 936–37.
133. Id. at 937.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 938.
136. Id. at 939.
137. Id. at 939, 941.
138. Id. at 941.
139. Id. at 941–42.
140. Id. at 942.
141. Id. (Nelson, J., concurring).
16
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torneys, his argument provided an in-depth analysis of why the protection
of children’s rights require attorneys and not only GALs.142
Justice Nelson argued that a child’s attorney serves a unique purpose
that cannot be replaced by a GAL.143 Specifically, Justice Nelson pointed
out that GALs and attorneys have different duties under the law; GALs are
factual investigators who submit reports to the court, and an attorney com-
municates and advocates solely for their client.144 More importantly, Justice
Nelson observed that Montana’s courts had held many times before that a
GAL advocates for the child’s best interests while a child’s attorney advo-
cates for the child’s wishes—which often directly contradict each other.145
For these reasons, Justice Nelson determined that a child deserves both an
attorney and a GAL.146
C. In re J.W.C.
In August of 2009, an Indian mother voluntarily placed her children in
foster care because she was unable to provide them food and shelter.147 At
the time, the children’s father was incarcerated.148 After their mother re-
tained temporary housing, the children were returned to live with her until
September 2009 when she was taken to the emergency room after report-
edly “taking pills and making suicidal threats.”149 The mother was subse-
quently arrested on an existing warrant and was banned from her temporary
housing because drug paraphernalia was found in her room.150 The district
court appointed the children a GAL that would also serve as their attor-
ney.151 Subsequently, the mother failed to complete her treatment plan.152
At the termination hearing, the children’s GAL recommended termina-
tion of the mother’s rights.153 The mother asked that the children be ap-
pointed an attorney, which the district court refused.154 The district court
stated that it would assume that the children wanted to return to their
mother as the GAL had expressed those were the children’s wishes.155 Ulti-
142. Id. at 942–44.
143. Id. at 942.
144. Id. at 942–43.
145. Id. at 943 (collecting cases).
146. Id.
147. In re J.W.C., 265 P.3d 1265, 1267 (Mont. 2011).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1268.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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mately, the district court terminated the mother’s rights.156 The mother ap-
pealed, arguing that the court failed to comply with ICWA transfer require-
ments.157 The children were appointed independent appellate counsel by the
Montana Supreme Court, and the children’s appellate attorney appealed,
arguing that the district court had erred by not granting the children an
attorney to which they were entitled under Article II, Section 15 of the
Montana Constitution.158
The Court refused to decide whether the children were entitled to be
appointed an attorney under Article II, Section 15.159 It held that in light of
its reversal on the ICWA error, there was no need to address the Article II,
Section 15 argument.160 The Court concluded, however, that there was an
apparent conflict between the children’s wishes and their best interests, and,
thus, the Court ordered that the children be appointed counsel on remand.161
D. In re T.D.H.
On April 27, 2012, three children, T.D.H., Je.H., and Ja.H., were re-
moved from their biological mother’s home and placed in foster care due to
concerns of abuse perpetrated by the children’s father and the failure of
their mother to protect the children from the abuse.162 In 2012, the district
court appointed an attorney to represent all three children.163 Likewise, in
July of 2012, the court appointed a CASA to represent the best interests of
the children.164 Almost two years later, the mother had failed to complete
her treatment plan and had engaged in harmful activities including drug use
and inappropriate statements to the children and their service providers.165
The court set a date for a termination hearing.166
At a pre-hearing conference for the termination proceeding, the chil-
dren’s attorney advised the district court that Ja.H. had expressed he no
longer wanted to be reunified with his mother.167 As this position was in
conflict with the attorney’s other two clients (T.D.H. and Je.H.), the attor-
ney asked the court to appoint Ja.H. independent counsel.168 The attorney
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1269.
158. Id. at 1268; Brief of Youths at 3–5, In re J.W.C., 265 P.3d 1265 (Mont. 2011) (DA 11-0227).
159. In re J.W.C., 265 P.3d at 1272.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457, 460 (Mont. 2015).
163. Brief of Appellant at 3, In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457 (Mont. 2015) (DA 15-0036).
164. T.D.H., 356 P.3d at 460.
165. Id. at 461.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 461–62.
18
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stated she did not feel she could represent “two points of view that [were]
. . . absolutely at odds.”169 The Department objected, noting that Ja.H. “had
a CASA who could represent his best interests,” and further, that because
Ja.H. did not want to be reunified with his mother, his wishes were being
advocated for by the attorneys who represented the Department.170 After
this hearing, OPD filed a Notice of Reassignment of Counsel for Ja.H. .171
The district court rescinded that appointment.172
At the termination hearing, the children’s attorney again voiced her
concerns about representing Ja.H.173 She stated she hoped counsel would be
appointed for Ja.H. in future proceedings.174 After the termination proceed-
ing, OPD moved to appoint Ja.H. new counsel.175 On December 18, 2014,
the district court denied that motion and granted the Department’s motion to
terminate the mother’s parental rights.176
OPD appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, asking the Court to
determine that “[t]he Montana Constitution guarantees children in abuse
and neglect proceedings the same right to counsel that their parents
have.”177 In analyzing OPD’s constitutional claim, the Montana Supreme
Court did not address its merits but instead held that the issue was not justi-
ciable.178 The majority explained that because the district court had termi-
nated the mother’s rights, and Ja.H. did not wish to be reunified with his
mother, he had already received what “a dedicated advocate for his interest”
would have sought.179 Additionally, the majority noted that whether Ja.H.’s
rights would be further violated if he was not appointed counsel was un-
clear because the proceedings had not yet happened.180 Therefore, the ma-
jority concluded Ja.H.’s appeal was not justiciable because it was both moot
and unripe, holding “[w]ere we able to conclude that Ja.H. had suffered the
deprivation of a right that could be redressed through the relief sought,
OPD’s and the dissent’s arguments may merit consideration.”181
Justice McKinnon dissented, arguing that “a competent child, possess-
ing a fundamental liberty interest in proceedings to terminate the rights of
169. Id. at 470 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
170. Id. at 461.
171. Id. at 461–62.
172. Id. at 462.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Brief of Appellant, supra note 165, at 6; Brief of Appellant [Youth J.A.H.] at 3, In re T.D.H.,
356 P.3d 457 (Mont. 2015) (DA 15-0036).
178. T.D.H., 356 P.3d at 464.
179. Id. at 463–64.
180. Id. at 464.
181. Id.
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his parents, is denied due process guaranteed by the Montana Constitution
when his voice in those proceedings is not represented by counsel.”182 The
dissent addressed the merits of OPD’s brief, finding that both the plain lan-
guage and the intent behind Article II, Section 15 entitle children to counsel
in dependency proceedings; ultimately, Justice McKinnon argued that the
right contained in Section 15 makes Montana’s GAL exception unconstitu-
tional.183
Justice McKinnon’s dissent first argued that the plain meaning of Arti-
cle II, Section 15, when read alongside Montana’s equal provision, entitles
children to counsel in dependency proceedings.184 She noted that Section
15 provides outright that children have all the same rights as adults.185
Therefore, because adults have the fundamental right to an attorney in de-
pendency proceedings, children must have a corollary right.186
Justice McKinnon explained why the rights of children in dependency
proceedings are corollary to the constitutional rights of adults. She argued
that compared to the right of parents to fundamental fairness iterated in
A.S.A. in dependency proceedings, a child has a “corresponding interest in
his or her own safety, health, and well-being,” which includes “maintaining
integrity of the family unit and having a relationship with his or her biologi-
cal parents.”187 Further, at-stake in a dependency proceeding for both par-
ents and children is the right to fundamental fairness in dependency pro-
ceedings.188
Justice McKinnon also argued that not providing children an attorney
in dependency proceedings does not “enhance the rights of minors,” and
thus, Montana’s GAL exception was unconstitutional.189 GALs and attor-
neys, as Justice McKinnon acknowledged, do not provide the same repre-
sentation to a child; while attorneys advocate for the child’s wishes, GALs
only advocate for the best interests of children, which the Court has found
can be directly contradictory to the child’s wishes.190 Additionally, Justice
McKinnon argued that attorneys are duty-bound to maintain confidentiality,
while a GAL or CASA is not.191 Therefore, Justice McKinnon concluded
that children have a fundamental liberty interest and right to live in a rea-
182. Id. at 469 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
183. Id. at 472.
184. Id. at 471–72.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 472.
187. Id. (comparing In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1993)).
188. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d at 472 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
189. Id. at 472.
190. Id. at 472–73.
191. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 26–1–803 (2015)).
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sonably safe condition, free from emotional, physical, and psychological
harm, which can only be adequately protected by an attorney.192
Looking at the framers’ intent, Justice McKinnon argued that the pur-
pose of Article II, Section 15 was to provide children equal protection under
the Montana Constitution that they were not provided under the United
States Constitution.193 Justice McKinnon delved into the constitutional con-
vention transcripts, finding that specifically, the framers intended children
to have the right to due process in court proceedings.194 Finally, Justice
McKinnon cited Court precedent which held “[c]learly . . . minors are af-
forded full recognition under the equal protection clause and enjoy all the
fundamental rights of an adult under Montana Constitution Article II.”195
Therefore, Justice McKinnon argued, the purpose of Article II, Section 15
was to provide children with the right to due process equal to that their
parents receive, which could only be served by appointing a child an attor-
ney in dependency proceedings.196
V. ANALYZING THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION TO FIND A RIGHT TO
COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 15
In his concurrence in A.D.B., Chief Justice McGrath stated that “noth-
ing in the Montana Constitution, statutes, or case law provides a right of
counsel for the child.”197 It is true that there is no explicit right in the Mon-
tana Constitution providing a right to counsel for children. However, the
Court has held before that Article II, Section 15 “clearly” affords minors
“full recognition under the equal protection clause [and allows them to]
enjoy all of the fundamental rights of an adult,” including the right to an
attorney under due process in Juvenile Court Proceedings.198
Likewise, given the text and intent behind Article II Section 15, and
particularly considering the rights of adults to counsel in dependency pro-
ceedings created in A.S.A., children in dependency proceedings must be
given the equal right to an attorney that their adult parents are provided
under Article II, Section 17.
192. Id. at 473.
193. Id. at 471–72 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION TRANSCRIPT 635–36; In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1373. (Mont. 1997)).
194. Id. at 471–72 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 2 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION TRANSCRIPT 635–36 (“What this means is that persons under the age of majority have been ac-
corded certain specific rights which are felt to be a part of due process.”)).
195. Id. (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1373).
196. Id. at 471–74 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting).
197. In re A.D.B., 305 P.3d 739, 751 (Mont. 2013) (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
198. In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d at 1373.
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A. Under Article II, Section 15, children must be appointed attorneys
in dependency proceedings
Under Article II, Section 15, children are entitled to all of the same
fundamental rights as adults.199 In A.S.A. the Court held that parents have a
fundamental right under Article II, Section 17 to the appointment of counsel
in dependency proceedings, because of the substantial threat of unfair pro-
cedure for a parent who stands to lose the important interest in the care and
custody of their biological child.200 As explained below, A.D.B., J.W.C.,
T.D.H, and R.M.T. all demonstrate that the children likewise have a signifi-
cant interest in a dependency proceeding that is at risk for being overrun by
unfair procedure. Therefore, following the text of the provision, the rights
of children in dependency proceedings shall include the fundamental right
to the appointment of an attorney.
1. Parents have a due process right to counsel in dependency
proceedings
A parent’s fundamental right to an attorney in dependency proceedings
under Article II, Section 17, Due Process of Law, comes from the vital
interest that parents have in the proceedings. In In Re R.B.,201 the Montana
Supreme Court held that a parent’s right to the care and custody of their
child is a “fundamental liberty interest” which must be protected by funda-
mentally fair procedures.202 The R.B. Court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court
in Santosky in defining where this fundamental liberty interest came from,
saying, “a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their
family life.”203 Indeed, the Court in A.S.A. relied on this definition of a
parent’s fundamental liberty interest when it mandated that all parents have
the right to be appointed an attorney in dependency proceedings.204 Thus, a
parent’s right to an attorney in dependency proceedings was born of that
parent’s vital interest in maintaining their family life. This concept, how-
ever, is not the only reason why parents have a right to an attorney in de-
pendency proceedings.
The parent’s right to an attorney in dependency proceedings also exists
because their vital interest outweighs the potential risk for unfair procedure.
As the court in A.S.A. explained, “due process [articulated in Article II,
199. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
200. In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129–130 (Mont. 1993).
201. In re R.B. 703 P.2d 846 (Mont. 1985).
202. Id. at 848 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982)).
203. Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753–54).
204. In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d at 129 (citing In Re R.B., 703 P.2d at 848) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at
753–54).
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Section 17] requires that the parent not be placed at an unfair disadvantage
during the termination proceedings.”205 This unfairness, the Court de-
scribed, results in the substantial risk that a parent may lose their parental
rights because of “intimidation, inarticulateness, or confusion” as
“[i]ndigent parents often have a limited education and are unfamiliar with
legal proceedings.”206 Here, again, the Court’s primary concern was that the
parent could lose their biological child. But more importantly, this explana-
tion provides the grounds for why due process in the form of an appointed
attorney is necessary in dependency proceedings—the likelihood of intimi-
dation, inarticulateness, or confusion. Parents, though, are not the only ones
in dependency proceedings with great interests which are at risk for being
overcome by the system.
2. The child’s strong interests and the risk of unfair procedure warrant
the appointment of an attorney in dependency proceedings.
A child’s interest is of central importance to the outcome of depen-
dency proceedings. In T.D.H., the Court stated that “[a] district court must
give primary consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional condi-
tions and needs of the child.”207 In doing so, the Court recognized the pri-
mary importance of the child’s interests to the outcome of a dependency
proceeding as a child’s interest must be considered above all else.
Indeed, a child’s interest in a dependency proceeding is so great that it
must be considered alongside the fundamental liberty interests parents have
in dependency proceedings. In T.D.H., the Court held that “[a] parent’s
right to the care and custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest that
must be protected . . . . However, a child’s best interests take precedence
over parental rights.”208 The side-by-side comparison of a child’s interests
and a parent’s rights in dependency proceedings displays the Court’s ex-
plicit recognition that the child’s interests in dependency proceedings are
important, perhaps even more so than the due process rights of their par-
ents. As these same due process rights gave rise to the requirement for the
parent’s appointed counsel in dependency proceedings, it follows that
courts must also be required to appoint counsel to protect the superior inter-
ests of the child in dependency proceedings.
A child’s interests are great enough to entitle the child to an attorney.
In T.D.H., the majority held that Ja.H.’s appeal, in which OPD argued that
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. at 47 (1981)).
207. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457, 463 (Mont. 2018) (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–609(3)
(2015)) (emphasis added (internal quotation omitted).
208. Id. at 463 (citing In re D.B., 168 P.3d 691, 695 (Mont. 2007); In re E.K., 37 P.3d 690, 697
(Mont. 2001)).
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Ja.H. had been deprived of his right to an attorney granted under Article II,
Section 15, was not justiciable. The Court held this because the appellants
had failed to prove that Ja.H. had suffered an injury since “Ja.H.’s interests
were served by terminating his parental rights,” the same result that “a dedi-
cated advocate for his interests” would have sought.209 Here, by stating that
Ja.H.’s appeal was unsuccessful merely because he already had an pseudo-
attorney who advocated for his rights, the majority implied that a child had
an interest worthy of an attorney’s protection. Further, the Court recognized
in T.D.H. “were we able to conclude that Ja.H. had suffered a deprivation of
a right that could be redressed through relief sought, OPD’s and the Dis-
sent’s arguments may merit consideration.”210 Here, again, the majority
agreed that a child in dependency proceedings has important interests, per-
haps fundamental rights, at stake. By dismissing Ja.H.’s argument on jus-
ticiability, the majority only held that Ja.H. had not proven his rights were
violated, not that Ja.H.’s interests were not worthy of an attorney’s protec-
tion under Article II, Section 15.
Additionally, a child’s wishes in dependency proceedings warrant an
attorney’s representation. In J.W.C., while the Court held it would not de-
cide whether children must be appointed attorneys under Article II, Section
15, it ultimately ordered that the children in J.W.C. be appointed an attorney
on remand to represent their wishes, even though they had already been
appointed a GAL to represent their best interests. This holding does not
state that children have a right to an attorney but notes the significance of
the conflict between the child’s best interests and the child’s wishes, ulti-
mately proving through the appointment of an attorney on remand that a
child’s wishes are important enough to warrant an attorney’s protection.
Likewise, Justice Nelson argued in his R.M.T. concurrence that Montana
courts have “consistently” recognized that there is a difference between
what a GAL advocates for—the child’s best interests—and what the child’s
attorney advocates for—the child’s wishes.211 Indeed, Justice Nelson
demonstrated the importance of a child being appointed both an attorney
and a GAL, because, in short, a GAL cannot adequately serve the child’s
wishes, which are important to dependency proceedings.212 Therefore, a
child’s wishes are strong enough to entitle the child to an attorney in depen-
dency proceedings.
Finally, like their parents, children’s interests are at risk of being over-
come by unfair procedure. In A.S.A., the court based the parent’s need for
due process on the high risk of unfair procedure in dependency proceedings
209. Id. at 463–64.
210. Id. at 464.
211. In re R.M.T., 256 P.3d 935, 943 (Mont. 2011) (Nelson, J., concurring).
212. Id. at 942–43 (Nelson, J., concurring).
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due to the parent’s limited education and unfamiliarity with legal proceed-
ings which might cause the parent to lose their child due to intimidation,
inarticulateness, or confusion.213 Likewise, and perhaps more so, children
in dependency proceedings are at risk of being taken advantage of by the
system due to their low level of education and lack of familiarity with the
system. As Chief Justice McGrath explained in his A.D.B. concurrence,
many children in dependency proceedings are “below the age of reason.”214
Although Chief Justice McGrath used this statement as part of his argument
that children should not be appointed attorneys, it also serves the logical
purpose of explaining why children must be appointed attorneys in depen-
dency proceedings. Children, like indigent parents, have a low legal educa-
tion level, and therefore are at substantial risk for unfair procedure which
can only be corrected by the appointment of an attorney.
Thus, the text of Article II, Section 15, and the interpretation of a
child’s interests and wishes in dependency proceedings in Montana’s case
law provide that a child must be appointed an attorney in dependency pro-
ceedings. This conclusion, however, is supported by more than the text of
Section 15.
B. Article II, Section 15 was intended to require that children be
appointed an attorney in dependency proceedings
Although the plain text of the provision provides the clearest explana-
tion of how Article II, Section 15 mandates a child’s right to an attorney in
dependency proceedings, the intent of the framers reinforces this conclu-
sion. As the framers explained in the comments for this provision, the pur-
pose of Section 15 was “to recognize that persons under the age of majority
have the same protections from governmental and majoritarian abuses as do
adults.”215 As explained above, mandating the appointment of an attorney
to children in dependency proceedings does just that; it protects children
from losing the vital interest they have in maintaining their biological fam-
ily where they are at risk for being overrun by the state. Even more on
point, the Section was created specifically to interact with the rights pro-
vided under Montana’s due process provision. As Delegate Monroe ex-
plained, Section 15 sought to ensure that children are “accorded certain spe-
cific rights which are felt to be a part of due process.”216 Providing children
attorneys in dependency proceedings simply aligns with the framer’s intent
by giving children the same due process rights and protections as adults.
213. In re A.S.A., 852 P.2d 127, 129–30 (Mont. 1993).
214. In re A.D.B., 305 P.3d 739, 751 (2013) (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
215. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 38, at 1750.
216. Id.
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VI. TOWARDS THE FUTURE: STRIKING DOWN
MONTANA’S GAL EXCEPTION
Montana’s Article II, Section 15 requires that children be appointed
attorneys in dependency proceedings. What this fact means for Montana’s
laws and courts is examined below. As noted in the background of this
article, Montana’s statutory scheme currently requires courts to appoint a
child an attorney in a dependency proceeding where a GAL is unavaila-
ble.217 However, as this comment has demonstrated, all children in depen-
dency proceedings must be appointed an attorney under Article II, Section
15. Therefore, Montana’s statute violates the rights of minors. As described
in Part III of this paper, to overcome a violation of Article II, Section 15,
the legislature must prove both a compelling state interest and that the vio-
lation enhances the protections of minors.
A. There is No Compelling State Interest for Not Appointing Children
an Attorney Under Montana Code Annotated
Section 41–3–425
For a violation of Article II, Section 15 to be constitutional, the statute
in question must meet strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to a com-
pelling state interest.218 A compelling government interest is one of the
“highest order,” for instance, matters of national security and heinous
crimes.219 Here, the interests of the State in not appointing an attorney are
financial; the transcripts of the 2011 session reveal that the legislature be-
lieved it was simply a waste of resources to appoint children an attorney.220
This reason is merely financial, and far from the “highest order” of interests
such as national security. Therefore, the statutes establishing a GAL excep-
tion violate Section 15 of the Montana Constitution because they do not
serve a compelling state interest. As strict scrutiny is necessary to make an
exception to Article II, Section 15 under Montana law, this alone is enough
for the provision to be unconstitutional unless the state can provide some
other compelling interest.
B. The GAL Exception does not Enhance the Protection of Minors
Even if the Court found that the statute met strict scrutiny, it would
still not be a valid violation of Article II, Section 15 because it does not
217. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41–3–425(2)(b) (2017).
218. See Part III of this comment; see also In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d 457, 471–72 (Mont. 2018) (Mc-
Kinnon, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing In re S.L.M., 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (Mont. 1997)).
219. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 375 n.6 (Mont. 1999) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
220. Jent, supra note 32, at 3:30, 4:37, 7:40.
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enhance the protection—or rights—of minors. Indeed, as Justice McKinnon
argued in her T.D.H. dissent, and as Justice Nelson argued in his concur-
rence, an attorney provides particular protections to a child in a dependency
proceeding that a GAL cannot provide.221 Therefore, as an attorney pro-
vides greater protections to children, denying a child an attorney cannot
enhance that child’s protection.
There is, however, a possible exception for children who are below the
“age of reason,” as Chief Justice McGrath suggested in his A.D.B. concur-
rence. Chief Justice McGrath argued not only that attorneys have no place
to make the appeals for children in these cases, but also noted that “[t]he
child is the subject of litigation but does not have the ability to provide
direction for the attorney as to how to proceed.”222 In his argument, Chief
Justice McGrath provided an interesting take: that children below the age of
reason are the subject of the litigation, and therefore not of enough sound
mind to share their opinions with the court.223 Under this analysis, the Court
must protect children below the age of reason by not subjecting them to the
“absurd[ity]” of being appointed a lawyer who cannot possibly direct their
attorney on how to proceed.224 Thus, looking at Chief Justice McGrath’s
argument, it is possible that an exception for children under the age of rea-
son might serve to enhance the protections of those minors by protecting
them from a proceeding prolonged and complicated by the presence of an
attorney without any client direction. This exception, however, is without
merit.
It is not impossible to competently represent a child under the age of
reason. Because children with low cognitive function have the same impor-
tant interests as other children and are at even greater risk for fundamental
unfairness in dependency proceedings, a failure to appoint them an attorney
simply because of their diminished capacity does not enhance their protec-
tions or rights. In 2011, the ABA adopted a new Model Act Governing the
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceed-
ings (The Model Act). First, The Model Act requires that all children in
dependency proceedings be appointed attorneys.225 Additionally, The
Model Act provides guidance on representing children who are of dimin-
221. In re T.D.H., 356 P.3d at 472 (McKinnon, J., concurring and dissenting); In re R.M.T., 256
P.3d 935, 943 (Mont. 2011) (Nelson, J., concurring).
222. In re A.D.B., 305 P.3d, 739, 751 (Mont. 2013) (McGrath, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 751–53.
224. Id. at 751–52.
225. Andrea Khoury, ABA Adopts Model Act on Child Representation, CHILD LAW PRACTICE, Sept.
2011, at 106, https://perma.cc/LG3J-QFJV (https://www.americanbar.org/groups/child_law/resources/
child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol30/september_2011/aba_adopts_modelactonchildrepre
sentation.html) (last visited August 6, 2018).
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ished capacity due to their age.226 The Model Act instructs courts and attor-
neys to work together to decide if a child has the capacity to direct their
representation and provides criteria for determining diminished capacity in
these cases including the child’s developmental stage, cognitive ability, and
communication skills.227 This approach gives the attorney clear guidelines
on how to best represent children of all ages and abilities in dependency
proceedings.228 Further, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, attorneys
who take advantage of incompetent clients are subject to professional disci-
pline.229 Thus, not appointing an attorney to a child on the basis that an
attorney may wrongfully advocate for a child who cannot direct representa-
tion is not a protection of the child worthy of an exception under Section
15.
Therefore, as Montana’s Statute violates the rights of minors, does not
serve a compelling state interest, and does not enhance the protections of
minors, I would urge the Court to find Section 41-3-425 unconstitutional.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE ANALYSIS IS SIMPLE
While the Montana Supreme Court has avoided the issue of Article II,
Section 15 it has provided all of the analysis necessary to determine that
children are entitled to an attorney in dependency proceedings. The Court
has already, on numerous occasions, acknowledged that a child’s interest is
central to a dependency proceeding and further that those interests cannot
be protected by a GAL in the same way that they are protected by counsel.
What, then, is stopping the Court from finding children must be appointed
an attorney under Montana’s Constitution? Perhaps the Court is placing too
much emphasis on the need to read Article II, Section 15 alongside equal
protection, or the difference between enhancing the “protections” vs. the
“rights” of minors. But the analysis under Section 15 is simple. Children are
entitled to the same rights as adults.230 Adults in dependency proceedings
have a fundamental right through due process to an attorney.231 Therefore,
Children must be given that same right.
226. Id. at 106–07.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017); MODEL R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.14
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
230. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
231. In re A.S.A. 852 P.2d 127, 130 (Mont. 1993).
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